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PROPERTY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
SPOUSES IN CALIFORNIA
Robert P. Aguilar* and Elva Soper Aguilar**
The community property system as it is practiced in California allows
married couples or couples planning marriage to enter into agreements
concerning the manner in which they will hold title to property regardless
of when the property is acquired. Today's lawyer is frequently called
upon to advise clients of the method which would be most advantageous
to them under the circumstances and to draw up the necessary agreement.
These agreements generally fall into three categories: (1) an ante-
nuptial agreement; (2) a postnuptial agreement when the parties are
not contemplating a divorce or separation; and (3) an agreement entered
into after, or at the time of a separation whether or not the separation
or the intention thereof is mentioned in such agreement.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Antenuptial agreements are regulated by statute' in California and
may include both presently owned real and personal property, as well as
after-acquired property. While no particular words are necessary for
their creation, there can be no provision in them which would tend to
induce a separation or divorce. For example, in Whiting v. Whiting,2
the court held void a provision calling for payment of a fixed sum to the
prospective wife in case of separation or divorce, said sum to cover all
her claims, including attorney fees.
The marriage itself is adequate consideration for the agreement. It
may be revoked or modified by post-marital agreements as long as they
are based on sufficient consideration. These agreements, as with other
types, are regulated by the rules of contract law.
Antenuptial agreements are often entered into where a prospective
wife desires to convert all of her separate property into community
property, or where one or both of the parties has a going business and
desires to continue it without having the income therefrom, or the incre-
ment in value of said business, being classified as community property.
The use of an antenuptial agreement could have avoided the problem
* LL.B. Hastings College of Law. Member of the State Bar of California. Associated
in the general practice of law in San Jose, California.
** LL.B. University of Southern California. Member of the State Bar of California.
Associated with the legal staff of Moore & Minor, official court reporters, San Jose,
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1 CAL. CIv. CODE § 178.
2 62 Cal.App. 177, 216 Pac. 92 (1923).
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posed in the well known cases of Pereira v. Pereira,s Van Camp v. Van
Camp,4 and in Estate of Pepper5
Another situation where this type of agreement might be useful is
where a prospective husband is paying alimony or child support as a
result of a prior marriage and desires to release all interest in his future
wife's acquisitions. The legal effect of such an agreement from the
standpoint of the husband's duty of support arising out of a prior marriage
is somewhat dubious insofar as the courts may at least consider that the
present wife has an independent income and is, therefore, perhaps, not
in need of his support-at least to the extent that his previous wife and
children are in need of it.
Antenuptial agreements under Civil Code Section 178 must be in
writing and executed and acknowledged or proved in the same manner as
a grant of land is required to be executed and acknowledged or proved.
However, like other contracts, the courts have held that once an oral
agreement is fully executed the provisions of the Statute of Frauds6 are
not applicable.7 To go a step further, the court in In re Piatt's Estate,8
held that since the requirements of Civil Code Section 178 are to protect
the wife against fraud by the husband, she may waive the requirement
of a writing by a special agreement or by affirmance of the oral agreement.
Antenuptial agreements are not transactions in which the parties are
deemed to occupy a confidential relationship since they are not yet man
and wife.
POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Agreements between husband and wife are provided for in Civil Code
Section 158. o Although the majority of contracts entered into by a married
couple under the sanction of the above section are those in anticipation
of divorce, couples will, on occasion, enter into a postnuptial agreement
with no thought of separation or divorce. Such agreements are valid
if there is adequate consideration.'0 As a rule they flx the property rights
of both spouses in whole or in part.
3 156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
4 53 Cal.App. 17, 199 Pac. 885 (1921).
5 158 Cal. 619, 112 Pac. 62 (1910).
6 Freltas v. Freitas, 31 Cal.App. 16, 159 Pac. 611 (1916).
CAL. CIv. CODE § 164.
8 81 Cal.App.2d 348, 183 P.2d 919 (1947).
9 This Section states: "Either a husband or wife may enter into any engagements or
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either
might if unmarried, subject in transaction between themselves, to the general rules which
control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other, as
defined by the title on trusts."
10 Smith v. Smith, 94 Cal.App. 35, 270 Pac. 463 (1928).
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Prior to the enactment of Civil Code Section 163.5,"' couples could
enter into a post-marital agreement that any recovery in a personal injury
action would be the wife's separate property.' 2 These agreements were
only valid when entered into prior to the accident and have now fallen
into disuse.
The most frequent type of post-marital agreement is an informal and,
in many cases, an unintentional one. A leading example of this type is
the agreement to change the manner in which title to property is held.
With the exception of the conversion of property into joint tenancy, it
is not necessary that such an agreement be reduced to writing.'8 "It is
well settled that property may be converted into community property
at any time by oral agreement between the spouses." 4
An illustration of this is the case where a couple orally agreed that
all property owned or subsequently acquired by them should belong to
them "fifty-fifty." This agreement was held to sustain a community prop-
erty finding.' 5 In another case, a couple executed a joint and mutual will
in which they made certain declarations as to the character of their
property. The court stated: "A single written instrument may constitute
both a will and a contract and we believe that the declarations contained
in a joint and mutual will must be held to have constituted an agreement
between the spouses fixing the status of the property as community
property."' 6
The parties may agree that the wife's earnings will be her separate
property. Such an agreement is one which relates to the acquisition of
property and is an engagement or transaction respecting property within
the meaning of Civil Code Section 158.1 Circumstantial evidence is
admissible to prove that such an agreement existed between the parties.'8
Courts have used income tax returns, prepared by the parties, to
show that they treated property which by statutory definition would be the
separate property of one as community thereby changing the character.'
However, evidence may also be produced to show this was not their
intent.20
Placing community funds into a joint bank account does not prevent
the operation of the usual community property rules. Section 852 of the
"1 This Section provides that all damages, special and general awarded to a married
person in a civil action for personal injuries are that person's separate property.
12 Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949); Flores v. Brown, 39
Cal.2d 622, 248 P.2d 922 (1952); Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273
's Estate of Patterson, 46 Cal.App. 415, 189 Pac. 483 (1920).
14 Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
'5 Kenney v. Kenney, 220 Cal. 134, 30 P.2d 398 (1934).
is Estate of Watkins, 16 Cal.2d 793, 108 P.2d 417 (1940).
17 Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 Pac. 775 (1893).is Kaltschmidt v. Weber, 145 Cal. 596, 79 Pac. 272 (1904).
'9 Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal.App.2d 50, 206 P.2d 391 (1949).
20 Hopkins v. Detrick, 97 Cal.App.2d 50, 217 P.2d 78 (1950).
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Financial Code was designed for the bank's protection and not to control
the character of the property.21 Civil Code Section 683 requires a writing
which expressly creates a joint tenancy before such a tenancy is created
in law. The application to open a joint bank account is, generally, not
a sufficient writing.
AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATING SEPARATION
The agreement which is most frequently employed by couples and
the one most familiar to the public is that made in contemplation of an
immediate separation or divorce or one made after the separation has
occurred. These agreements are valid22 and are highly favored in the
law.3 In Adams v. Adams, Justice Traynor, speaking for the Court, states:
Property settlement agreements occupy a favored position in
the law of this state and are sanctioned by the Civil Code...
Such agreements are usually made with the advice of the counsel
after careful negotiations, and the courts, in accord with legis-
lative sanction, prefer agreement rather than litigation ...
When the parties have finally agreed upon the division of theirproperty, the courts are loath to disturb their agreement except
for equitable consideration.24
Provision in the statutes which refer to agreements made in con-
templation of immediate separation are equally applicable to agreements
for support entered into after a separation has taken place. 21 The primary
reason for these agreements is to provide for a transfer of property to
the wife or for payments to her by the husband which they agree will
preclude further or other liability on the part of the husband for support.
The wording varies but generally includes such clauses as the wife
"waives any and all claims to any further support"2" and releases the
husband "from all claims to arise in the future in the nature of support. ' 27
Often the parties will include provisions pertaining to child support and
custody, agreements as to insurance policies, and they may agree to terms
which a court in a divorce action would not have jurisdiction to determine,
such as agreeing to provide for the wife's support after her remarriage.2 8
While adequate consideration must be present to support these agree-
ments, mutual promises of support have been held to be sufficient con-
21 Basically, this section provides that money deposited in a bank by two or more
persons to be payable to the survivor or survivors shall be held by them as jointtenants; it also sets forth the rules governing such deposits and the liability of thebank with regard to the payments of such funds.
22 Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943); Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal.
App.2d 113, 93 P.2d 175 (1939).
23 Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 183 Pac. 445 (1918).
24 29 C.2d 621, 624; 177 P.2d 265, 267 (1947).
25 Kemper v. Waldon, 17 Cal.2d 718, 122 P.2d 1 (1941).
26 Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 51 Cal.App. 347, 196 Pac. 799 (1921).
27 Gazave v. Gazave, 97 Cal. App. 603, 275 Pac. 996 (1929).
28 Rasson v. Crellin, 10 Cal.App.2d 753, 203 P.2d 841 (1949).
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sideration.29 In Price v. Price,3 0 the husband and wife orally agreed to
reduce the amount of payments due to the wife under a separation agree-
ment. This modification was held to be effective since an executed oral
agreement will serve as a modification or release of a written agreement
without regard to the presence or absence of consideration.
FRAUD AND DURESS
As with other contracts, these agreements are invalid when they are
secured through fraud, undue influence or duress. In dealings with each
other, the parties are governed by the general rules which control the
action of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.3' The
mere existence of a marriage does not in and of itself support a pre-
sumption of undue influence; 2 but the courts will scrutinize an agreement
to see that it is fair and reasonable, and if it appears that the husband
has secured an advantage over the wife, the existence of the confidential
relationship may be invoked to bring the presumption into play.
In short, a husband . . . if he would avoid the presumption of
undue influence emanating from the procurement of any ad-
vantage over her (must) make full and fair disclosure to her
of all that she should know for her benefit and protection con-
cerning the nature and effect of the transaction, or else he must
deal with her at arm's length and as he would with a stranger,
all the while giving her the opportunity of independent advice
as to her right in the premises.
3 3
Where an agreement is based on fraud, undue influence or duress,
the wife is not required to account for money received thereunder in a
subsequent action for separate maintenance,3 4 nor does the acceptance and
retention of the benefits act as an estoppel.
3 5
If at the time the agreement is entered into the relationship of the
parties is unfriendly-especially when they have been living separate
and apart for some time and the negotiations are conducted between their
attorneys-there is no presumption of undue influence.
3 6
29-CAL. CIV. CODE § 160; Briner v. Briner, 63 Cal.App.2d 429, 146 P.2d 709 (1944);
Gummerson v. Gummerson, 14 Cal.App.2d 450, 58 P.2d 394 (1936).
30 24 Cal.App.2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938).
31 CAL. CIV. CODE § 158, see supra note 9.
32 Tillaux v. Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663, 47 Pac. 691 (1897); McDougall v. McDougall,
135 Cal. 316, 67 Pac. 779 (1902).
33 Estate of Covet, 188 Cal. 133, 144, 204 Pac. 583, 583 (1922); see also Marsiglia v.
Marsiglia, 78 Cal.App.2d 701, 178 P.2d 478 (1947).
34 Davis v. Davis, 49 Cal.App.2d 239, 121 P.2d 523 (1942).
35 Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 204 Pac. 583 (1922); Paddon v. Paddon 194 Cal.
73, 227 Pac. 715 (1924).
36 Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 183 Pac. 445 (1918); Chadwick v. Chadwick,
95 Cal.App. 690, 273 Pac. 86 (1928); Migala v. Dakin, 99 Cal.App. 60, 277 Pac.
898 (1924).
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In Senter v. Senter,87 the wife's attorney had asked the husband
certain questions relating to the extent of his property. The husband
intentionally misinformed the attorney. The court held that although the
requested information was a matter of public record, the attorney had a
right to rely on the defendant husband's representation and therefore
set aside the property settlement agreement that had been entered into
based upon his misrepresentations.
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
A property or support agreement once entered into may be terminated
by rescission, 8 subsequent agreement or by its own terms. The parties
may not, however, discharge their obligations under the agreement in
bankruptcy.39 Nor will a divorce decree per se terminate a property agree-
ment that was entered into before a separation or divorce was con-
templated. 40 The agreement may or may not, depending upon its terms,
survive the death of one or both of the parties.
Ordinarily, the fact that the parties to a divorce later cohabitate and
resume the marital rights, duties and obligations" terminates the agree-
ment as far as the executory provisions are concerned 42 and revives the
husband's duty of support. Generally, in such a case, no court proceeding
is necessary to set aside the agreement; but in the event the issue does
go to trial, the evidence to sustain a finding that the parties did intend
to reconcile and resume the marital relations and, in addition, terminate
the agreement must be clear and convincing." Destruction of the docu-
ment, execution of reconveyances when necessary, or restoration of control
of the one who formerly exercised it, would tend to show such an
intention."
Reconciliation will not relieve the parties of obligations which arose
under the agreement prior to the date of reconciliation unless they consent
thereto. Nor will reconciliation revoke the property settlement provisions
if the parties agree otherwise.
If the parties enter into an agreement, the main purpose being to
induce one of the parties to procure divorce, such agreement is void as
37 70 Cal. 619, 11 Pac. 782 (1886).
38 LoVasco v. LoVasco, 46 Cal.App.2d 242, 115 P.2d 562 (1941).
89 D'Andria v. Hageman, 253 App. Div. 518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1938).
40 Estate of Brimhall, 62 Cal.App.2d 30, 143 P.2d 981 (1943); Plante v. Gray, 68
Cal.App.2d 582, 157 P.2d 421 (1945).
41 Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 255 Pac. 800 (1927).
42 Lloyd Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 61 Cal.App.2d 275, 142 P.2d 754(1943); Mundt v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal.App.2d 416, 95 P.2d 966 (1939).
43 Estate of Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 255 Pac. 800 (1927).
44 Plante v. Gray, 68 Cal.App.2d 582, 157 P.2d 421 (1945); Crossley v. Crossley,
97 Cal.App.2d 627, 218 P.2d 132 (1950); DeVault v. DeVault, 90 Cal.App.2d 15, 202
P.2d 375 (1949).
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being contrary to public policy. For instance, an agreement not to defend
or contest a divorce suit by the other spouse,45 or to withdraw opposition
thereto,46 has been held void for that reason. A contract to pay attorney
fees in a contemplated divorce was held invalid as promotive of divorce
because it tended to deter reconciliation.4 7 But it has been held that a
contract for dismissal or continuance of a divorce action based on con-
sideration is valid when it contains a provision to pay the wife a certain
sum if in the future the husband gives her further cause for divorce.4 8
In Hill v. Hill,49 a separation agreement was made in contemplation
of divorce'and conditioned thereon to the extent that it was not to
become effective except on the obtaining of a decree of divorce by one
or the other spouse. The court found that this agreement was valid and
enforceable since prior to the agreement the parties were living separate
and apart as a result of a marital offense committed by the husband
which constituted good grounds for divorce, and the parties had no
intention or expectation of resuming marital relations. The court stated
therein:
Public policy seeks to foster and protect marriage, to encour-
age parties to live together, and to prevent separation . . . But
public policy does not discourage divorce where the relations
between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects
of matrimony have been utterly destroyed. . . In the absence
of fraud, collusion or imposition upon the court, public policy
does not prevent parties who have separated from entering into
a contract disposing of their property rights which shall become
effective only in the event one of the parties obtains a divorce,
even though such a contract may be a factor in persuading a
party who has a good cause for divorce to proceed to establish
it.50
Thus, it would seem that if the parties were already separated on a
permanent basis and grounds for divorce were in existence at the time
the agreement was drawn, and there was no intention or expectation of
resuming marital relations, they could make an agreement which in effect
encouraged them to obtain a divorce. However, unless all these elements
were present, it would seem that the agreement would be void as against
public policy.
CONCLUSION
A detailed discussion of the so-called "Integrated Property Settlement
Agreement" has been avoided for the reason that such would warrant
45 Lanktree v. Lanktree, 42 Cal.App. 648, 183 Pac. 954 (1919).
46 Loveren v. Loveren, 106 Cal. 509, 39 Pac. 801 (1895).
47 McCahan v. McCahan, 47 Cal.App. 173, 190 Pac. 458 (1920).
48 Bowden v. Bowden, 175 Cal. 711, 167 Pac. 154 (1917); dist. Pereira v. Pereira,
156 Cal. 1, 103 Pac. 488 (1909).
49 23 Cal.2d 82, 142 P.2d 417(1943).
50 Id. at 93, 142 P.2d at 422.
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an article in itself. Furthermrz, tl.,. Ikefs!.-ture amended Civil Code
Section 139, thereby making those integrated agreements subject to modi-
fication by the court except where there is no issue born of the marriage.
In summary, then, it should be noted there are many ways by which
married couples may contract with reference to property presently or
prospectively owned by them. To be sure, not all the possible methods
presently used have been outlined. However, the methods discussed
above are the ones most frequently used and certainly the ones most
frequently ending in litigation. A properly drafted agreement, prepared
pursuant to existing authority, may serve a useful and sometimes ad-
vantageous purpose to a California husband and wife.
